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Keywords Language, Mathematics, Philosophy
Abstract This article investigates Rugina's orientation table and gives particular examples for
several of its seven models. Leon Walras's Economics of Stable Equilibrium and Keynes's
Economics of Disequilibrium are combined in Rugina's orientation table in systems which are s
percent stable and 100 ÿ s percent unstable, where s may be 100, 95, 65, 50, 35, 5, and 0.
Classical logic and modern logic are united in Rugina's integrated logic, and then generalized in
neutrosophic logic.

I. Introduction
Coming across Rugina's system of thoughts, in his published books and
articles (Rugina, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1998), I learned about the connection between
classic and modern. It is not a contradiction, but a complementarity from the
part of modern with respect to the classic; and always the new ``modern'' will
have something to bring to the old knowledge. In a similar way we may talk on
the complementarity between theory and practice, rather than their
contradiction.
In economics, Rugina negated Marx's social justice for the mass and
Keynes's involuntary unemployment. His methology in science tries to unite
all scientific fields, preserving, however, independence in thinking and
judgement. Einstein worked in the last period of his life on the unified field
theory (a single general theory in physics), but didn't succeed. At the present,
his supposition that the speed of light is a barrier in the universe is also being
denied.
The economical systems are characterized by free market or centrallyplanned and controlled economy. I think each system has a mixture of the
previous, where a part of the market is free and another is centrally-planned
and controlled.
Rugina's universal hypothesis of duality states that the physical universe is
composed of stable and unstable elements arranged in various proportions,
may be completed with unknown elements, a strip border between stable and
unstable, which are continously changing from the state of equilibrium to
disequilibrium and vice-versa, and which therefore are giving the dynamics of
the universe.
Unknowns may be:
.
anomalies;
.
relativities;
.
uncertainties;
.
revolution risks; and
.
hidden parameters.
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The internal parameters are involved in Rugina's universal law of natural
International
Journal of Social parameter (NaPa):
Any system in order to reach and maintain a position of stable equilibrium must have a very
Economics
strong natural parameter (center of weight).
28,8
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Whereas the external parameters are involved in Rugina's universal law of
general consistency:
Any system produces and maintains a position of stable equilibrium if there is a suitable
space-time frame work.

II. Theory of paradoxes
How did I get to the theory of paradoxes? I have observed that: what's good for
someone, may be bad for others ± and reciprocally. There are people who are
considered terrorists by their enemies, and patriots by their friends. All of them
are right and wrong at the same time. If one changes the referential system, the
result is different.
Let's see a few nice paradoxes:
Social paradox. In a democracy should the nondemocratic ideas be allowed?
(a) If yes, i.e. the nondemocratic ideas are allowed, then one has not a
democracy anymore. (The nondemocratic ideas may overturn the
society.)
(b) If no, i.e. other ideas are not allowed ± even those nondemocratic ± then
one has not a democracy either, because the freedom of speech is
restricted.
The sets' paradox. The notion of ``set of all sets'', introduced by Georg Cantor,
does not exist.
Let all sets be noted by {Sa}a, where a indexes them. But the set of all sets is
itself another set, say T1 ; and then one constructs again another ``set of hall
setsi'', but hall setsi are this time {Sa } and T1 , and then the ``set of all sets'' is
now T2 , different from T1 ; and so on. Even the notion of ``all sets'' can not
exactly be defined (like the largest number of an open interval, which doesn't
exist), as one was just seeing above (we can construct a new set as the ``set of all
sets'') and reunites it to ``all sets''.
A paradoxist psychological coÂmplex (with the accent on the first syllable).
A collection of fears stemming from previous unsuccessful experience or from
unconscious feelings that, wanting to do something hSi, the result would be
hAnti-Si, which give rise to feelings, attitudes, and ideas pushing the subject
towards a deviation of action hSi eventually towards an hAnti-Si action. (From
the positive and negative brain's electrical activities.) For example, a shy boy,
attempting to invite a girl to dance, inhibits himself through fear that she
would turn him down. How to manage this phobia? To dote and anti-dote! By
transforming it into an opposite one, thinking differently, and being fear in our
mind that we would pass our expectancies but we shouldn't. People who do not
try for fear of being rejected: they lose by not competing!
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Auto-suggestion
If an army leaves for war with anxiety to lose, that army is half-defeated before
starting the confrontation.
Paradoxist psychological behavior. How can we explain contrary behaviors of
a person: in the same conditions, without any reason, cause? Because our deep
unconsciousness is formed of contraries.
Ceaseless anxiety. What you want is, normally, what you don't get. And this
is for eternity. Like a chain, because, when you get it (if ever), something else
will be your next desire. Man can't live without a new hope.
Inverse desire. The wish to purposely have bad luck, to suffer, to be
pessimistic as stimulating factors for more and better creation or work.
(Applies to some artists, poets, painters, sculptors, spiritualists.)
All is possible, the impossible too! Is this an optimistic or pessimistic
paradox?
(a) It is an optimistic paradox, because it shows that all is possible.
(b) It is a pessimistic paradox, because it shows that the impossible is
possible.
Mathematician's paradox. Let M be a mathematician who may not be
characterized by his mathematical work.
(a) To be a mathematician, M should have some mathematical work done,
therefore M should be characterized by that work.
(b) The reverse judgement: if M may not be characterized by his
mathematical work, then M is not a mathematician.
Divine paradox (I). Can God commit suicide?
(a) If God cannot, then it appears that there is something God cannot do,
therefore God is not omnipotent.
(b) If God can commit suicide, then God dies ± because He has to prove it,
therefore God is not immortal.
Divine paradox (II). Can God be atheist, governed by scientific laws?
(a) If God can be atheist, then God doesn't believe in Himself, therefore why
should we believe in Him?
(b) If God cannot, then again He's not omnipotent.
Religion is full of god-ism and evil-ism. God and evil in the same being. Man is
a bearer of good and bad simultaneously. Man is enemy to himself. God and
Magog!
Expect the unexpected. If we expect someone to do the unexpected, then:
.

Is it possible for him to do the unexpected?

.

Is it possible for him to do the expected?
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If he does the unexpected, then that's what we expected. If he doesn't do the
International
Journal of Social expected, then he did the unexpected.
The ultimate paradox. Living is the process of dying.
Economics
Reciprocally: death of one is the processes of somebody else's life (an animal
28,8
eating another one).

Downloaded by Professor Florentin Smarandache At 08:11 27 April 2018 (PT)

626

Exercises for readers:
.
If China and Japan are in the Far East, why from the USA do we go west
to get there?
.
Are humans inhuman, because they committed genocides?

The invisible paradoxes. Our visible world is composed of a totality of
invisible particles. Things with mass result from atoms with quasi-null mass.
Infinity is formed of finite part(icle)s.
Look at these Sorites paradoxes (associated with Eubulides of Miletus,
fourth century BC):
(a) An invisible particle does not form a visible object, nor do two invisible
particles, three invisible particles, etc. However, at some point, the
collection of invisible particles becomes large enough to form a visible
object, but there is apparently no definite point where this occurs.
(b) A similar paradox is developed in an opposite direction. It is always
possible to remove an atom from an object in such a way that what is left
is still a visible object. However, repeating and repeating this process, at
some point, the visible object is decomposed so that the part left becomes
invisible, but there is no definite point where this occurs.
Between hAi and hNon-Ai there is no clear distinction, no exact frontier. Where
does hAi really end and hNon-Ai begin? We extend Zadeh's fuzzy set term to
fuzzy concept.
Paradoxist existentialism
Life's value consists in its lack of value; life's sense consists in its lack of sense.
Semantic Paradox (I): ``I am who I am not''. If I am not Socrates, and since I
am who I am not, it results that I am Socrates. If I am Socrates, and since I am
who I am not, it results that I am not Socrates. Generally speaking: ``I am X'' if
and only if ``I am not X''. Who am I?
In a similar pattern one constructs the paradoxes: ``I am myself when I am
not myself''; and ``I exist when I don't exist''. And, for the most part, ``I {verb}
when I don't {verb}'' (Smarandache, 1997).
What is a dogma? Is it an idea that makes you have no other idea. How can
we get rid of such authoritative tenet? (To un-read and un-study it!)
Semantic Paradox (II): ``I don't think''. This can not be true for, in order to
even write this sentence, I needed to think (otherwise I was writing with
mistakes, or was not writing it at all). Whence ``I don't think'' is false, which
means ``I think''.
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Unsolved mysteries:
(a) Is it true that for each question there is at least an answer?
(b) Is any statement the result of a question?
(c) Let P n be the following assertion: ``If S n is true, then S n  1 is
false'', where S n is a sentence relating on parameter n. Can we prove
by mathematical induction that P n is true?
(d) ``hAi is true if and only if hAi is false''. Is this true or false?
(e) How can this assertion ``Living without living'' be true? Find a context.
Explain.
Other examples of such paradoxes are:
.
hAnti-Ai of hAi (anti-literature of literature);
.
hNon-Ai of hAi (language of non-language); and
.
hAi of hNon-Ai (artistic of the non-artistic).
Tautologies. I want because I want (showing will, ambition) (hAi because of
hAi) (Smarandache, 1997).
Other examples include:
.
Our axiom is to break down all axioms.
.
Be patient without patience.
.
Non-existence exists.
.
Culture exists through its non-existence.
.
Our culture is our lack of culture.
.
Style without style.
.
The rule we apply: there is no rule.
Paradox of the paradoxes
Is ``this is a paradox'' a paradox? I mean is it true or false? Examples are:
.
To speak without speaking (without words (body language)).
.
To communicate without communicating.
.
To do the impossible.
.
To know nothing about everything, and everything about nothing.
.
I do only what I can't! If I can't do something, of course ``I can do'' is false.
And, if I can do, it's also false because I can do only what I am not able
to do.
.
I cannot for I can.
.
Paradoxal sleep, from a French ``Larousse'' dictionary (1989), is a phase
of the sleep when the dreams occur. Sleep, sleep, but why paradoxal?
How do the dreams put up with reality?
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.

.

Is O.J. Simpson's crime trial an example of: justice of injustice, or
injustice of justice? However, his famous release is a victory against the
system!
Corrupt the incorruptible!

Everything which is not paradoxist, is, however, paradoxist. This is the great
universal paradox. A superparadox (as a superman in a hyperspace).
Facts exist in isolation from other facts (the analytic philosophy), and in
connection as well with each other (Whitehead's and Bergson's thoughts). The
neutrosophic philosophy unifies contradictory and noncontradictory ideas in
any human field.
The antagonism doesn't exist. Or, if the antagonism does exist, this becomes
(by neutrosophic view) a non- (or un-)antagonism: a normal thought. I don't
worry about it as well as Wordsworth.
Platonism is the observable of unobservable, the thought of the non-thought.
The essence of a thing may never be reached. It is a symbol, a pure and
abstract and absolute notion.
An action may be considered g percent good (or right) and b percent bad (or
wrong), where 0  g  b  100 ± the remainder being indeterminacy, not only
hgoodi or only hbadi ± with rare exceptions, if its consequence is g percent
happiness (pleasure). In this case the action is g percent-useful (in a semiutilitarian way). Utilitarism shouldn't work with absolute values only!
Verification has a pluri-sense because we have to demonstrate or prove that
something is t percent true, and f percent false, where 0  t, f  100 and
t  f  100, not only t  0 or 100 ± which occurs in rare/absolute exceptions,
by means of formal rules of reasoning of this neutrosophic philosophy.
The logical cogitation's structure is discordant. Scientism and empiricism
are strongly related. They can't run one without other, because one exists in
order to complement the other and to differentiate it from its opponent. Plus
doesn't work without minus, and both of them supported by zero. They all are
cross-penetrating sometimes up to confusion. The non-understandable is
understandable. If vices wouldn't exist, the virtues will not be seen (T.
Mu atescu).
Any new born theory (notion, term, event, phenomenon) automatically
generates its non-theory ± not necessarily anti-(notion, term, event,
phenomenon). Generally speaking, for any hAi a hNon-Ai (not necessarily
hAnti-Ai) will exist for compensation.
The neutrosophy is a theory of theories, because at any moment new ideas
and conceptions are appearing and implicitly their negative and neutral senses
are highlighted.
The non-important is important, because the first one is the second one's
shadow that makes it grow its value. The important things would not be so
without any unimportant comparison.
The neutrosophic philosophy accepts a priori and a posteriori any
philosophical idea, but associates it with adverse and neutral ones, as a
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summum. This is to be neutrosophic without being! Its schemes are related to
the neutrality of everything.
III. On Rugina's orientation table
Starting from a new viewpoint in philosophy, the neutrosophy, one extends the
classical ``probability theory'', ``fuzzy set'' and ``fuzzy logic'' to hneutrosophic
probabilityi, hneutrosophic seti and hneutrosophic logici respectively.
They are useful in artificial intelligence, neural networks, evolutionary
programming, neutrosophic dynamic systems, quantum theory, and decision
making in economics.
With the neutrosophic logic help one explores Rugina's orientation table, a
remarkable tool of study, at the micro- and macro-level, of problems in all
sciences.
(1) Neutrosophy: a new branch of mathematical philosophy
(A) Etymology. Neutro-sophy (French neutre < Latin neuter, neutral, and Greek
sophia, skill/wisdom) means knowledge of neutral thought.
(B) Definition. Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy which studies the
origin, nature, and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with
different ideational spectra.
(C) Characteristics. This mode of thinking:
.
proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas,
movements;
.
interprets the uninterpretable;
.
regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: showing
that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in
another one, and vice versa;
.
measures the stability of unstable systems, and instability of stable
systems.
(D) Methods of neutrosophic study. The methods of neutrosophic study are
mathematization (neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic probability and statistics,
duality), generalization, complementarity, contradiction, paradox, tautology,
analogy, reinterpretation, combination, interference, aphoristic, linguistic, and
multidisciplinarity.
(E) Formalization. Let's note by hAi an idea or theory or concept, by hNon-Ai
what is not hAi, and by hAnti-Ai the opposite of hAi. Also, hNeut-Ai means
what is neither hAi, nor hAnti-Ai, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes.
And hA0 i a version of hAi. hNon-Ai is different from hAnti-Ai.
For example, if hAi = white, then hAnti-Ai = black (antonym), but hNon-Ai
= green, red, blue, yellow, black, etc. (any color, except white), while hNeut-Ai =
green, red, blue, yellow, etc. (any color, except white and black), and hA0 i =
dark white, etc. (any shade of white). hNeut-Ai  hNeut-(Anti-A)i, neutralities
of hAi are identical with neutralities of hAnti-Ai.
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hNon-Ai  hAnti-Ai, and hNon-Ai  hNeut-Ai as well, also hAi \ hAnti-Ai
International

,
hAi \ hNon-Ai  . hAi, hNeut-Ai, and hAnti-Ai are disjoint two by two.
Journal of Social
hNon-Ai
is the completitude of hAi with respect to the universal set.
Economics
(F) Main principle. Between an idea hAi and its opposite hAnti-Ai, there is a
28,8
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continuum-power spectrum of neutralities hNeut-Ai.
(G) Fundamental thesis.
Any idea hAi is t percent true, i percent indeterminate, and f percent false,
where t  i  f  100.
(H) Main laws. Let h i be an attribute, and (a, i, b) " [0, 100]3, with
a  i  b  100. Then:
.

.

.

There is a proposition hPi and a referential system hRi, such that hPi is a
percent h i, i percent indeterminate or hNeut- i, and b percent hAnti- i.
For any proposition hPi, there is a referential system hRi, such that hPi
is a percent h i, i percent indeterminate or hNeut- i, and b percent
hAnti- i.
h i is at some degree hAnti- i, while hAnti- i is at some degree h i.

(2) Neutrosophic probability and neutrosophic statistics
Let's first generalize the classical notions of ``probability'' and ``statistics'' for
practical reasons.
(A) Definitions. Neutrosophic probability studies the chance that a particular
event E will occur, where that chance is represented by three coordinates
(variables): t percent true, i percent indeterminate, and f percent false, with
t  i  f  100 and f, i, t " [0, 100]. Neutrosophic statistics is the analysis of
such events.
(B) Neutrosophic probability space. The universal set, endowed with a
neutrosophic probability defined for each of its subsets, forms a neutrosophic
probability space.
(C) Applications.
(1) The probability that candidate C will win an election is say 25 percent
true (percentage of people voting for him), 35 percent false (percentage of
people voting against him), and 40 percent indeterminate (percentage of
people not coming to the ballot box, or giving a blank vote ± not
selecting anyone, or giving a negative vote ± cutting all candidates on
the list). Dialectic and dualism don't work in this case anymore.
(2) Another example, the probability that tomorrow it will rain is say 50
percent true according to meteorologists who have investigated the past
years' weather, 30 percent false according to today's very sunny and
droughty summer, and 20 percent undecided (indeterminate).
(3) Neutrosophic set
Let's second generalize, in the same way, the fuzzy set.
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(A) Definition. Neutrosophic set is a set such that an element belongs to the
set with a neutrosophic probability, i.e. t percent is true that the element is in
the set, f percent false, and i percent indeterminate.
(B) Neutrosophic set operations. Let M and N be two neutrosophic sets. One
can say, by language abuse, that any element neutrosophically belongs to any
set, due to the percentage of truth/indeterminacy/falsity which varies between
0 and 100. For example: x 50; 20; 30"M (which means, with a probability of 50
percent x is in M, with a probability of 30 percent x is not in M, and the rest is
undecidable), or y 0; 0; 100"M (which normally means y is not for sure in M),
or z 0; 100; 0"M (which means one doesn't know absolutely anything about z's
affiliation with M).
Let 0  t1 ; t2 ; t0  1 represent the truth-probabilities, 0  i1 ; i2 ; i0  1 the
indeterminacy-probabilities, and 0  f1 ; f2 ; f 0  1 the falsity-probabilities of an
element x to be in the set M and in the set N respectively, and of an element y to
be in the set N, where t1  i1  f1  1; t2  i2  f2  1, and t 0  i0  f 0  1.
One notes, with respect to the given sets, x  x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M and
x  x t2 ; i2 ; f2 "N , by mentioning x's neutrosophic probability appurtenance.
And, similarly, y  y t0 ; i0 ; f 0 "N .
Also, for any 0  x  1 one notes 1 ÿ x  x. Let W a; b; c  1 ÿ a/
b  c and W R  W R t; R i; R f  for any tridimensional vector
R  R t; R i; R f .
Complement of M: Let N x  1 ÿ x  x. Therefore: if x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M , then
x N t1 ; N i1 W N , N f1 W N "C M .
Intersection. Let C x; y  xy, and C z1 ; z2   C z for any bidimensional
vector z  z1 ; z2 . Therefore: if x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M, x t2 ; i2 ; f2 "N , then x C t,
C iW C, C f W C"M \ N .
Union. Let D1 x; y  x  y ÿ xy  x  xy  y  xy, and D1 z1 ; z2   D1 z
for any bidimensional vector z = (z_1, z_2). Therefore: if x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M ,
x t2 ; i2 ; f2 "N , then x D1 t; D1 iW D1; D1 f W D1"M [ N .
Cartesian product. If x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M ; y t 0 ; i0 ; f 0 "N , then x t1 ; i1 ; f1 ,
y t0 ; i0 ; f 0 "MxN :
Difference. Let D x; y  x ÿ xy  xy, and D z1 ; z2   D z for any
bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 . Therefore: if x t1 ; i1 ; f1 "M , x t2 ; i2 ; f2 "N ,
then x D t; D iW D; D f W D"M =N , because M =N  M \ C N .
(C) Applications. From a pool of refugees, waiting in a political refugee camp
to get the American visa of emigration, a percent are accepted, r percent
rejected, and p percent in pending (not yet decided), a  r  p  100. The
chance for someone in the pool to emigrate to USA is not a percent as in
classical probability, but a percent true and p percent pending (therefore
normally bigger than a percent) ± because later, the p percent pending refugees
will be distributed into the first two categories, either accepted or rejected.
Another example, a cloud is a neutrosophic set, because its borders are
ambiguous, and each element (water drop) belongs with a neutrosophic
probability to the set (e.g. there are separated water drops, around a compact
mass of water drops, that we don't know how to consider them: in or out of the
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cloud). We are not sure where the cloud ends nor where it begins, neither if
some elements are or are not in the set. That's why the percent of
indeterminacy is required: for a more organic, smooth, and especially accurate
estimation.
(4) Neutrosophic logic: a generalization of fuzzy logic
(A) Introduction. One passes from the classical {0; 1} bivalent logic of George
Boole, to the three-valued logic of Reichenbach (leader of the logical
empiricism), then to the {0; a1 ; . . . ; an ; 1} plurivalent one of Lukasiewicz (and
Post's m-valued calculus), and finally to the [0; 1] infinite logic as in
mathematical analysis and probability: a transcendental logic (with values of
the power of continuum), or fuzzy logic.
Falsehood is infinite, and truthhood quite alike; in between, at different
degrees, indeterminacy as well. Everything is G percent good, I percent
indeterminate, and B percent bad, where G  I  B  100.
Besides Diderot's dialectics on good and bad (``Rameau's Nephew'', 1772),
any act has its percentage of ``good'', ``indeterminate'', and of ``bad'' as well
incorporated.
Rodolph Carnap said:
Metaphysical propositions are neither true nor false, because they assert nothing, they
contain neither knowledge nor error. . .

Hence, there are infinitely many statuses in between ``good'' and ``bad'', and
generally speaking in between ``A'' and ``Anti-A'', like on the real number
segment:
0;
False
Bad
Non-sense
Anti-A

1
True
Good
Sense
A

0 is the absolute falsity, 1 the absolute truth. In between each opposite pair,
normally in a vicinity of 0.5, are being set up the neutralities.
There exist as many states in between ``true'' and ``false'' as in between
``good'' and ``bad''. Irrational and transcendental standpoints belong to this
interval.
Even if an act apparently looks to be only good, or only bad, the other
headed side should be sought. The following ratios vary indefinitely
Anti-A Non-A
;
:
A
A
They are transfinite.
If a statement is 30 percent T (true) and 60 percent I (indeterminate), then it
is 10 percent F (false). This is somehow alethic, meaning pertaining to
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truthhood and falsehood in the same time. In opposition to fuzzy logic, if a
statement is 30 percent T doesn't involve it is 70 percent F. We have to study its
indeterminacy as well.
(B) Definition of neutrosophic logic. This is a generalization (for the case of
null indeterminacy) of the fuzzy logic. Neutrosophic logic is useful in the realworld systems for designing control logic, and may work in quantum
mechanics.
If a proposition P is t percent true, doesn't necessarily mean it is 100 ÿ t
percent false as in fuzzy logic. There should also be a percentage of
indeterminacy on the values of P. A better approach of the logical value of P is f
percent false, i percent indeterminate, and t percent true, where t  i  f  100
and t; i; f "0; 100, called neutrosophic logical value of P, and noted by
n P  t; i; f .
Neutrosophic logic means the study of neutrosophic logical values of the
propositions. There exist, for each individual event, PRO parameters, CONTRA
parameters, and NEUTER parameters which influence the above values.
Indeterminacy results from any hazard which may occur, from unknown
parameters, or from new arising conditions. This resulted from practice.
(C) Applications.
(1) ``The candidate C, who runs for election in a metropolis M of p people
with right to vote, will win''. This proposition is, say, 25 percent true
(percentage of people voting for him), 35 percent false (percentage of
people voting against him), and 40 percent indeterminate (percentage of
people not coming to the ballot box, or giving a blank vote ± not
selecting anyone, or giving a negative vote ± cutting all candidates on
the list).
(2) ``Tomorrow it will rain''. This proposition is, say, 50 percent true
according to meteorologists who have investigated the past years'
weather, 30 percent false according to today's very sunny and droughty
summer, and 20 percent undecided.
(3) ``This is a heap''. As an application to the sorites paradoxes, we may now
say this proposition is t percent true, f percent false, and i percent
indeterminate (the neutrality comes for we don't know exactly where is
the difference between a heap and a non-heap; and, if we approximate
the border, our ``accuracy'' is subjective).
We are not able to distinguish the difference between yellow and red as well if a
continuum spectrum of colors is painted on a wall imperceptibly changing from
one into another.
(D) Definition of neutrosophic logical connectors. One uses the definitions of
neutrosophic probability and neutrosophic set. Let 0  t1 , t2  1 represent
the truth-probabilities, 0  i1 ; i2  1 the indeterminacy-probabilities, and
0  f1 ; f2  1 the falsity-probabilities of two events P1 and P2 respectively,
where t1  i1  f1  1 and t2  i2  f2  1. One notes the neutrosophic logical
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values of P1 and P2 by:
International
Journal of Social
n P1   t1 ; i1 ; f1  and n P2   t2 ; i2 ; f2 :
Economics
Also, for any 0  x  1 one notes 1 ÿ x  x. Let W a; b; c  1 ÿ a= b  c
28,8
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and W R  W R t; R i; R f  for any tridimensional vector R  R t;
R i; R f .
Negation. Let N x  1 ÿ x  x. Then:
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n :P1   N t1 ; N i1 W N ; N f1 W N :
Conjunction. Let C x; y  xy, and C z1 ; z2   C z for any bidimensional
vector z  z1 ; z2 . Then:
n P1 ^ P2   C t; C iW C; C f W C:
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
Weak or inclusive disjunction. Let D1 x; y  x  y ÿ xy  x  xy  y  xy,
and D1 z1 ; z2   D1 z for any bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 . Then:
n P1 _ P2   D1 t; D1 iW D1; D1 f W D1:
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
Strong or exclusive disjunction. Let D2 x; y  x 1 ÿ y  y 1 ÿ xÿ
xy 1 ÿ x 1 ÿ y  xy  xy ÿ xyxy, and D2 z1 ; z2   D2 z for any
bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 . Then:
n P1 _P2   D2 t; D2 iW D2; D2 f W D2:
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
Material conditional (implication). Let I x; y  1 ÿ x  xy  x  xy 
1 ÿ xy, and I z1 ; z2   I z for any bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 . Then:
n P1 ! P2   I t; I iW I ; I f W I :
Material
biconditional
(equivalence).
Let
E x; y  1 ÿ x  xy




1 ÿ y  xy  x  xy y  xy  1 ÿ xy 1 ÿ xy, and E z1 ; z2   E z for
any bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 :
n P $ Q  E t; E iW E; E f W E:
Sheffer's connector. Let S x; y  1 ÿ xy, and S z1 ; z2   S z for any
bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 :
n P j Q  n :P _ :Q  S t; S iW S; S f W S:
Peirce's connector: Let P x; y  1 ÿ x 1 ÿ y  xy, and P z1 ; z2   P z
for any bidimensional vector z  z1 ; z2 .
n P # Q  n :P ^ :Q  P t; P iW P; P f W P:

(E) Properties of neutrosophic logical connectors.
Let's note by t P the truth-component of the neutrosophic value n P, and
t P  p, t Q  q.
(a) Conjunction. t P ^ Q  minfp; qg:
1
^
t P  0 if t P 6 1:
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k1

(b) Weak disjunction. t P _ Q  maxfp; qg:
1
_
t P  1 if t P 6 0:
k1

(c) Implication. t P ! P  1 if t P  0 or 1, and > p otherwise:
lim t P ! Q  1

t P!0

lim t P ! Q  1

t Q!1

lim t P ! Q  q

t P!1

lim t P ! Q  1 ÿ p

t Q!0

(d) Equivalence. t P $ Q  t Q $ P  t :P $ :Q:
lim t P $ Q  1

t P!0
t Q!0

lim t P $ Q  1

t P!1
t Q!1

lim t P $ Q  0

t P!0
t Q!1

lim t P $ Q  0

t P!1
t Q!0

lim t P $ Q  1 ÿ q

t P!0

lim t P $ Q  q

t P!1

Let q 6 0; 1 be constant, and one notes pmax q  q2 ÿ 3q  1= 2q2 ÿ 2q.
Then max t P $ Q occurs when 0  t P  1. p  pmax q if pmax q"0; 1,
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or p  0 if pmax q < 0, or p  1 if pmax q > 1, because the equivalence
International
connector
is described by a parabola of equation:
Journal of Social
Economics
eq p  q2 ÿ qp2  ÿq2  3q ÿ 1p  1 ÿ q:
28,8
This equation is concave down.
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(5) Neutrosophic topology
(A) Definition. Let's construct a neutrosophic topology on NT  0; 1, considering
the associated family of subsets (0; p), for 0  p  1, the whole set 0; 1, and the
empty set   0; 0, called open sets, which is closed under set union and
finite intersection. The union is defined as 0; p [ 0; q  0; d, where
d  p  q ÿ pq, and the intersection as 0; p \ 0; q  0; c, where c  pq.
The complementary of 0; p is 0; n, where n  1 ÿ p, which is a closed set.
(B) Neutrosophic topological space. The interval NT, endowed with this
topology, forms a neutrosophic topological space.
(C) Isomorphicity. Neutrosophic logical space, neutrosophic topological
space, and neutrosophic probability space are all isomorphic.
A method of neutrosophy is described below.
(6) Transdisciplinarity
(A) Introduction. Transdisciplinarity means to find common features to
uncommon entities: hAi \ hNon-Ai 6 , even if they are disjunct.
(B) Multi-structure and multi-space. I consider that life and practice do not
deal with ``pure'' spaces, but with a group of many spaces, with a mixture of
structures, a ``mongrel'', a heterogeneity ± the ardently preoccupation is to
reunite them, to constitute a multi-structure.
I thought to a multi-space also: fragments (potsherds) of spaces put together,
say as an example: Banach, Hausdorff, Tikhonov, compact, paracompact, Fock
symmetric, Fock antisymmetric, path-connected, simply connected, discrete
metric, indiscrete pseudo-metric, etc. spaces that work together as a whole
mechanism. The difficulty is to be the passage over ``frontiers'' (borders
between two disjoint spaces); i.e. how can we organically tie a point P1 from a
space S1 with a point P2 from a structurally opposite space S2 ?
Does the problem become more complicated when the spaces' sets are not
disjoint?
Let S1 and S2 be two distinct structures, induced by the group of laws L
which verify the axiom groups A1 and A2 respectively, such that A1 is strictly
included in A2 .
One says that the set M , endowed with the properties is called an
S1 -structure with respect to the S2 -structure:
.
M has an S1 -structure;
.
there is a proper subset P (different from the empty set, from the unitary
element, and from M) of the initial set M which has an S2 -structure; and
.
M doesn't have an S2 -structure.
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Let S1 , S2 , . . ., Sk be distinct space-structures. We define the multi-space (or
k-structured-space) as a set M such that for each structure Si , 1  i  k, there is
a proper (different from  and from M) subset Mi of it which has that structure.
The M1 , M2 , . . ., Mk proper subsets are different two by two.
Let's introduce new terms.
(C) Psychomathematics. A discipline which studies psychological processes
in connection with mathematics.
(D) Mathematical modeling of psychological processes. Weber's law and
Fechner's law on sensations and stimuli are improved.
(E) Psychoneutrosophy. Psychology of neutral thought, action, behavior,
sensation, perception, etc. This is a hybrid field deriving from theology,
philosophy, economics, psychology, etc. For example, to find the psychological
causes and effects of individuals supporting neutral ideologies (neither
capitalists, nor communists), politics (not in the left, not in the right), etc.
(F) Socioneutrosophy. Sociology of neutralities. For example, the sociological
phenomena and reasons which determine a country or group of people or class
to remain neutral in a military, political, ideological, cultural, artistic, scientific,
economical, etc. international or internal war (dispute).
(G) Econoneutrosophy. Economics of non-profit organizations, groups, such
as: churches, philanthropic associations, charities, emigrating foundations,
artistic or scientific societies, etc. How they function, how they survive, who
benefits and who loses, why are they necessary, how they improve, how they
interact with for-profit companies.
These terms are in the process of development.
(7) Rugina's orientation table
In order to clarify the anomalies in science, Rugina (1989, 1998) proposes an
original method, starting first from an economic point of view but generalizing
it to any science, to study the equilibrium and disequilibrium of systems. His
table comprises seven basic models:
(1) Model M1 (which is 100 percent stable)
(2) Model M2 (which is 95 percent stable, and 5 percent unstable);
(3) Model M3 (which is 65 percent stable, and 35 percent unstable);
(4) Model M4 (which is 50 percent stable, and 50 percent unstable);
(5) Model M5 (which is 35 percent stable, and 65 percent unstable);
(6) Model M6 (which is 5 percent stable, and 95 percent unstable); and
(7) Model M7 (which is 100 percent unstable)
He gives orientation tables for physical sciences and mechanics (Rugina, 1989,
p. 18), for the theory of probability, for logic, and generally for any natural or
social science (Rugina, 1989, pp. 286-88):
An anomaly can be simply defined as a deviation from a position of stable equilibrium
represented by Model M1 (Rugina, 1989, p. 17).

On Rugina's
system of
thought
637

Rugina proposes the universal hypothesis of duality:
International
Journal of Social
The physical universe in which we are living, including human society and the world of ideas,
all are composed in different and changeable proportions of stable (equilibrium) and unstable
Economics
(disequilibrium) elements, forces, institutions, behavior and value.
28,8
He also proposes the general possibility theorem:
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. . .there is an unlimited number of possible combinations or systems in logic and other
sciences.

According to the last assertations one can extend Rugina's orientation table in
the way that any system in each science is s percent stable and u percent
unstable, with s  u  100 and both parameters 0  s; u  100, somehow
getting to a fuzzy approach.
But, because each system has hidden features and behaviors, and there
would always be unexpected occuring conditions we are not able to control ±
we mean the indeterminacy plays a role as well, a better approach would be the
neutrosophic model:
Any system in each science is s percent stable, i percent indeterminate, and u percent
unstable, with s  i  u  100 and all three parameters 0  s; i; u  100.

Examples of Rugina's orientation table are given in Appendices 1-5.
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Appendix 1. Example of model M3 in Rugina's orientation table
The paradoxist geometry (actually the percentage of instability is between 20-35)
In 1969, intrigued by geometry, I simultaneously constructed a partially Euclidean and partially
non-Euclidean space by a strange replacement of the Euclid's fifth postulate (axiom of parallels)
with the following five-statement proposition:
(1) there are at least a straight line and a point exterior to it in this space for which only one
line passes through the point and does not intersect the initial line (1 parallel);
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(2) there are at least a straight line and a point exterior to it in this space for which only a
finite number of lines l1 , . . ., lk k  2 pass through the point and do not intersect the
initial line (two or more (in a finite number) parallels);
(3) there are at least a straight line and a point exterior to it in this space for which any line
that passes through the point intersects the initial line (0 parallels);
(4) there are at least a straight line and a point exterior to it in this space for which an
infinite number of lines that pass through the point (but not all of them) do not intersect
the initial line (an infinite number of parallels, but not all lines passing through); and
(5) there are at least a straight line and a point exterior to it in this space for which any line
that passes through the point does not intersect the initial line (an infinite number of
parallels, all lines passing through the point).
This geometry unites all together: Euclid, Lobachevsky/Bolyai, and Riemann geometries. And
separates them as well!
Appendix 2. First example of model M7 in Rugina's orientation table
The non-geometry (the percentage of instability is 100)
It's a lot easier to deny the Euclid's five postulates than Hilbert's 20 thorough axioms:
(1) It is not always possible to draw a line from an arbitrary point to another arbitrary point.
For example this axiom can be denied only if the model's space has at least a
discontinuity point (in our model bellow, MD, one takes an isolated point I in between f 1
and f 2, the only one which will not verify the axiom).
(2) It is not always possible to extend by continuity a finite line to an infinite line. For
example, consider the model bellow, and the segment AB, where both A and B lie on f 1,
A in between P and N, while B on the left side of N; one can not at all extend AB either
beyond A or beyond B, because the resulted curve, noted say A0 -A-B-B0 , would not be a
geodesic (i.e. line in our Model) anymore.
If A and B lie in delta1-f 1, both of them closer to f 1, A in the left side of P, while B in
the right side of P, then the segment AB, which is in fact A-P-B, can be extended beyond
A and also beyond B only up to f 1 (therefore one gets a finite line too, A0 -A-P-B-B0 , where
A0 , B0 are the intersections of PA, PB respectively with f 1). If A, B lie in delta1-f 1, far
enough from f 1 and P, such that AB is parallel to f 1, then AB verifies this postulate.
(3) It is not always possible to draw a circle from an arbitrary point and of an arbitrary
interval. For example, same as for the first axiom, the isolated point I, and a very small
interval not reaching f 1 neither f 2, will deny this axiom.
(4) Not all the right angles are congruent. (See example of the anti-geometry, explained
below.)
(5) If a line, cutting two other lines, forms the interior angles of the same side of it strictly
less than two right angles, then not always the two lines extended towards infinite cut
each other in the side where the angles are strictly less than two right angles. For
example, let h1, h2 and l be three lines in delta1-delta2, where h1 intersects f 1 in A, and
h2 intersects f 1 in B, with A, B, P different from each other, such that h1 and h2 do not
intersect, but l cuts h1 and h2 and forms the interior angles of one of its sides (towards
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f 1) strictly less than two right angles; the assumption of the fifth postulate is fulfilled,
but the consequence does not hold, because h1 and h2 do not cut each other (they may
not be extended beyond A and B respectively, because the lines would not be geodesics
anymore).
Appendix 3. Second example of model M7 in Rugina's orientation table
The counter-projective geometry (the percentage of instability is 100)
Let P, L be two sets, and r a relation included in P  L. The elements of P are called points, and
those of L lines. When (p, l) belongs to r, we say that the line l contains the point p. For these, one
imposes the following counter-axioms:
.

There exist: either at least two lines, or no line, that contains two given distinct points.

.

Let p1, p2, p3 be three non-collinear points, and q1, q2 two distinct points. Suppose that
fp1; q1; p3g and fp2; q2; p3g are collinear triples. Then the line containing p1, p2, and
the line containing q1, q2 do not intersect.

.

Every line contains at most two distinct points.

Does the duality principle hold in a counter-projective space? What about Desargues's
theorem, fundamental theorem of projective geometry/theorem of Pappus, and Staudt algebra?
Or Pascal's theorem, Brianchon's theorem? (I think none of them will hold!) However, Rugina's
hypothesis of duality does hold (althrough the this geometry is formed by unstable elements
only!).
Appendix 4. Third example of model M7 in Rugina's orientation table
The anti-geometry (the percentage of instability is 100 ± even. . . more, this is the geometry of total
chaos!)
It is possible to entirely de-formalize Hilbert's groups of axioms of the Euclidean geometry, and
to construct a model such that none of his fixed axioms holds.
Let's consider the following things:
.

a set of hpointsi: A; B; C; . . .;

.

a set of hlinesi: h; k; l; . . .; and

.

a set of hplanesi: alpha, beta, gamma, . . .

Let us also consider a set of relationships among these elements: ``are situated'', ``between'',
``parallel'', ``congruent'', ``continuous'', etc.
Then, we can deny all Hilbert's 20 axioms (see Hilbert, 1950; Binola, 1938).
There exist cases, within a geometric model, when the same axiom is verified by certain
points/lines/planes and denied by others.
Group I. Anti-axioms connection
I.1. Two distinct points A and B do not always completely determine a line.
Let's consider the following model MD: get an ordinary plane delta, but with an infinite hole
as shown in Fugure A1.
Plane delta is a reunion of two disjoint planar semi-planes; f 1 lies in MD, but f 2 does not;
P, Q are two extreme points on f that belong to MD.
One defines a LINE l as a geodesic curve: if two points A, B that belong to MD lie in l,
then the shortest curve lying in MD between A and B lies in l also. If a line passes twice
through the same point, then it is called double point (KNOT).
One defines a PLANE alpha as a surface such that for any two points A, B that lie in
alpha and belong to MD there is a geodesic which passes through A, B and lies in alpha
also.
Now, let's have two strings of the same length: one ties P and Q with the first string s1
such that the curve s1 is folded in two or more different planes and s1 is under the plane
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Figure A1.
A model of connection
delta; next, do the same with string s2, tie Q with P, but over the plane delta and such that
s2 has a different form from s1; and a third string s3, from P to Q, much longer than s1.
s1, s2, s3 belong to MD.
Let I, J, K be three isolated points ± as some islands, i.e. not joined with any other point
of MD, exterior to the plane delta. This model has a measure, because the (pseudo-)line is
the shortest way (length) to go from a point to another (when possible). Of course, this
model is not perfect, and is far from the best. Readers are asked to improve it, or to make
up a new one that is better. (Let A, B be two distinct points in delta1-f 1. P and Q are two
points on s1, but they do not completely determine a line, referring to the first axiom of
Hilbert, because A-P-s1-Q are different from B-P-s1-Q.)
I.2.

There is at least a line l and at least two distinct points A and B of l, such that A and B do
not completely determine the line l. (Line A-P-s1-Q are not completely determined by P and
Q in the previous construction, because CVB-P-s1-Q is another line passing through P and
Q too.)

I.3.

Three points A, B, C not situated in the same line do not always completely determine a
plane alpha. (Let A, B be two distinct points in delta1-f 1, such that A, B, P are not co-linear.
There are many planes containing these three points: delta1 extended with any surface s
containing s1, but not cutting s2 in between P and Q, for example.)

I.4.

There is at least a plane, alpha, and at least three points A, B, C in it not lying in the same
line, such that A, B, C do not completely determine the plane alpha. (See the previous
example.)

I.5.

If two points A, B of a line l lie in a plane alpha, it doesn't mean that every point of l lies in
alpha. (Let A be a point in delta1-f 1, and B another point on s1 in between P and Q. Let
alpha be the following plane: delta1 extended with a surface s containing s1, but not cutting
s2 in between P and Q, and tangent to delta2 on a line QC, where C is a point in delta2-f 2.
Let D be point in delta2-f 2, not lying on the line QC. Now, A, B, D are lying on the same line
A-P-s1-Q-D, A, B are in the plane alpha, but D is not.)

International
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I.6.

If two planes alpha, beta have a point A in common, it doesn't mean they have at least a
second point in common. (Construct the following plane alpha: a closed surface containing
s1 and s2, and intersecting delta1 in one point only, P. Then alpha and delta1 have a single
point in common.)

I.7.

There exist lines where lies only one point, or planes where lie only two points, or space
where lie only three points. (Hilbert's I.7 axiom may be contradicted if the model has
discontinuities. Let's consider the isolated points area. The point I may be regarded as a
line, because it's not possible to add any new point to I to form a line. One constructs a
surface that intersects the model only in the points I and J.)
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Group II. Anti-axioms of order
II.1. If A, B, C are points of a line and B lies between A and C, it doesn't mean that always B lies
also between C and A.
[Let T lie in s1, and V lie in s2, both of them closer to Q, but different from it. Then: P, T, V
are points on the line P-s1-Q-s2-P (i.e. the closed curve that starts from the point P and lies
in s1 and passes through the point Q and lies back to s2 and ends in P), and T lies between
P and V ± because PT and TV are both geodesics ± but T doesn't lie between V and P
because from V the line goes to P and then to T, therefore P lies between V and T.]
[By definition: a segment AB is a system of points lying upon a line between A and B (the
extremes are included). Warning, AB may be different from BA; for example: the segment
PQ formed by the system of points starting with P, ending with Q, and lying in s1, is
different from the segment QP formed by the system of points starting with Q, ending with
P, but belonging to s2. Worse, AB may be sometimes different from AB; for example, the
segment PQ formed by the system of points starting with P, ending with Q, and lying in
s1, is different from the segment PQ formed by the system of points starting with P, ending
with Q, but belonging to s2.]
II.2.

If A and C are two points of a line, then: there does not always exist a point B lying
between A and C, or there does not always exist a point D such that C lies between A and D.
[For example, let F be a point on f 1, F different from P, and G a point in delta1, G doesn't
belong to f 1; draw the line l which passes through G and F; then there exists a point B
lying between G and F ± because GF is an obvious segment ± but there is no point D such
that F lies between G and D ± because GF is right bounded in F (GF may not be extended
to the other side of F, because otherwise the line will not remain a geodesic anymore).]

II.3.

There exist at least three points situated on a line such that one point lies between the other
two, and another point lies also between the other two.
[For example, let R, T be two distinct points, different from P and Q, situated on the line
P-s1-Q-s2-P, such that the lenghts PR, RT, TP are all equal; then R lies between P and T,
and T lies between R and P; also P lies between T and R.]

II.4.

Four points A, B, C, D of a line can not always be arranged such that B lies between A and
C and also between A and D, and such that C lies between A and D and also between B
and D.
[For example:
.

.

let R, T be two distinct points, different from P and Q, situated on the line P-s1-Q-s2-P
such that the lenghts PR, RQ, QT, TP are all equal, therefore R belongs to s1, and T
belongs to s2; then P, R, Q, T are situated on the same line: such that R lies between P
and Q, but not between P and T ± because the geodesic PT does not pass through R ±
and such that Q does not lie between P and T ± because the geodesic PT does not pass
through Q ± but lies between R and T.
Let A, B be two points in delta2-f 2 such that A, Q, B are colinear, and C, D two points on
s1, s2 respectively, all of the four points being different from P and Q; then A, B, C, D
are points situated on the same line A-Q-s1-P-s2-Q-B, which is the same with line A-Q-

s2-P-s1-Q-B, therefore we may have two different orders of these four points in the same
time: A, C, D, B and A, D, C, B.]
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II.5.

Let A, B, C be three points not lying in the same line, and l a line lying in the same plane
ABC and not passing through any of the points A, B, C. Then, if the line l passes through a
point of the segment AB, it doesn't mean that always the line l will pass through either a
point of the segment BC or a point of the segment AC.
[For example, let AB be a segment passing through P in the semi-plane delta1, and C a
point lying in delta1 too on the left side of the line AB; thus A, B, C do not lie on the same
line; now, consider the line Q-s2-P-s1-Q-D, where D is a point lying in the semi-plane delta2
not on f 2: therefore this line passes through the point P of the segment AB, but does not
pass through any point of the segment BC, nor through any point of the segment AC.]

Group III. Anti-axiom of parallels
In a plane alpha there can be drawn through a point A, lying outside of a line l, either no line, or
only one line, or a finite number of lines, or an infinite number of lines which do not intersect the
line l. (At least two of these situations should occur.) The line(s) is (are) called the parallel(s) to l
through the given point A.
[For example:
.

Let l0 be the line N-P-s1-Q-R, where N is a point lying in delta1 not on f 1, and R is a
similar point lying in delta2 not on f 2, and let A be a point lying on s2, then: no parallel to
l0 can be drawn through A (because any line passing through A, hence through s2, will
intersect s1, hence l0, in P and Q).

.

If the line l1 lies in delta1 such that l1 does not intersect the frontier f 1, then through any
point lying on the left side of l1 one and only one parallel will pass.

.

Let B be a point lying in f 1, different from P, and another point C lying in delta1, not on
f 1; let A be a point lying in delta1 outside of BC; then: an infinite number of parallels to
the line BC can be drawn through the point A.

Theorem. There are at least two lines l1, l2 of a plane, which do not meet a third line l3 of the
same plane, but they meet each other, (i.e. if l1 is parallel to l3, and l2 is parallel to l3, and all of
them are in the same plane, it's not necessary that l1 is parallel to l2).
[For example: consider three points A, B, C lying in f 1, and different from P, and D a point in
delta1 not on f 1; draw the lines AD, BE and CE such that E is a point in delta1 not on f 1 and both
BE and CE do not intersect AD; then: BE is parallel to AD, CE is also parallel to AD, but BE is not
parallel to CE because the point E belongs to both of them.]
Group IV. Anti-axioms of congruence
IV.1. If A, B are two points on a line l, and A0 is a point upon the same or another line l 0 , then
upon a given side of A0 on the line l 0 , we can not always find only one point B0 so that the
segment AB is congruent to the segment A0 B0 .
[For example:
.

.

Let AB be segment lying in delta1 and having no point in common with f 1, and
construct the line C-P-s1-Q-s2-P (noted by l 0 ) which is the same with C-P-s2-Q-s1-P,
where C is a point lying in delta1 not on f 1 nor on AB; take a point A0 on l 0 , in between
C and P, such that A0 P is smaller than AB; now, there exist two distinct points B10 on
s1 and B20 on s2, such that A0 B10 is congruent to AB and A0 B20 is congruent to AB,
with A0 B10 different from A0 B20 .
But if we consider a line l 0 lying in delta1 and limited by the frontier f 1 on the right
side (the limit point being noted by M), and take a point A0 on l 0 , close to M, such that
A0 M is less than A0 B0 , then there is no point B0 on the right side of l 0 so that A0 B0 is
congruent to AB.]
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A segment may not be congruent to itself!
[For example, let A be a point on s1, closer to P, and B a point on s2, closer to P also; A and
B are lying on the same line A-Q-B-P-A which is the same with line A-P-B-Q-A, but AB
measured on the first representation of the line is strictly greater than AB measured on
the second representation of their line.]
IV.2.

If a segment AB is congruent to the segment A0 B0 and also to the segment A00 B00 , then not
always the segment A0 B0 is congruent to the segment A00 B00 .
[For example, let AB be a segment lying in delta1-f 1, and consider the line C-P-s1-Q-s2P-D, where C, D are two distinct points in delta1-f 1 such that C, P, D are colinear. Suppose
that the segment AB is congruent to the segment CD (i.e. C-P-s1-Q-s2-P-D). Get also an
obvious segment A0 B0 in delta1-f 1, different from the preceding ones, but congruent to
AB. Then the segment A0 B0 is not congruent to the segment CD (considered as C-P-D, i.e.
not passing through Q).

IV.3.

If AB, BC are two segments of the same line l which have no points in common aside from
the point B, and A0 B0 , B0 C 0 are two segments of the same line or of another line l 0 having
no point other than B0 in common, such that AB is congruent to A0 B0 and BC is congruent
to B0 C 0 , then not always the segment AC is congruent to A0 C 0 .
[For example, let l be a line lying in delta1, not on f 1, and A, B, C three distinct points on l,
such that AC is greater than s1; let l 0 be the following line: A0 -P-s1-Q-s2-P where A0 lies in
delta1, not on f 1, and get B0 on s1 such that A0 B0 is congruent to AB, get C 0 on s2 such
that BC is congruent to B0 C 0 (the points A, B, C are thus chosen); then the segment A0 C 0
which is first seen as A0 -P-B0 -Q-C 0 is not congruent to AC, because A0 C 0 is the geodesic
A0 -P-C 0 (the shortest way from A0 to C 0 does not pass through B0 ) which is strictly less
than AC.]
Definitions. Let h, k be two lines having a point O in common. Then the system (h, O, k) is
called the angle of the lines h and k in the point O. (Because some of our lines are curves,
we take the angle of the tangents to the curves in their common point.)
The angle formed by the lines h and k situated in the same plane, noted by <(h, k), is
equal to the arithmetic mean of the angles formed by h and k in all their common
points.

IV.4.

Let an angle (h, k) be given in the plane alpha, and let a line h0 be given in the plane beta.
Suppose that in the plane beta a definite side of the line h0 be assigned, and a point O0 .
Then in the plane beta there are one, or more, or even no half-line(s) k0 emanating from the
point O0 such that the angle (h, k) is congruent to the angle (h0 , k0 ), and at the same time the
interior points of the angle (h0 , k0 ) lie upon one or both sides of h0 .
For example:
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.

Let A be a point in delta1-f 1, and B, C two distinct points in delta2-f 2; let h be the line
A-P-s1-Q-B, and k be the line A-P-s2-Q-C; because h and k intersect in an infinite
number of points (the segment AP), where they normally coincide ± i.e. in each such
point their angle is congruent to zero, the angle (h, k) is congruent to zero. Now, let A0
be a point in delta1-f 1, different from A, and B0 a point in delta2-f 2, different from B,
and draw the line h0 as A0 -P-s1-Q-B0 ; there exist an infinite number of lines k0 , of the
form A0 -P-s2-Q-C 0 (where C 0 is any point in delta2-f 2, not on the line QB0 ), such that
the angle (h, k) is congruent to (h0 , K 0 ), because (h0 , k0 ) is also congruent to zero, and the
line A0 -P-s2-Q-C 0 is different from the line A0 -P-s2-Q-D0 if D0 is not on the line QC 0 .

.

If h, k, and h0 are three lines in delta1-P, which intersect the frontier f 1 in at most one
point, then there exists only one line k0 on a given part of h0 such that the angle (h, k) is
congruent to the angle (h0 , k0 ).

.

Is there any case when, with these hypotheses, no k0 exists ?

.

Not every angle is congruent to itself; for example, <(s1, s2) is not congruent to <(s1, s2)
[because one can construct two distinct lines: P-s1-Q-A and P-s2-Q-A, where A is a
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point in delta2-f 2, for the first angle, which becomes equal to zero; and P-s1-Q-A and
P-s2-Q-B, where B is another point in delta2-f 2, B different from A, for the second
angle, which becomes strictly greater than zero!].
IV. 5.

If the angle (h, k) is congruent to the angle (h0 , k0 ,) and the angle (h00 , k00 ), then the angle
(h0 , k0 ) is not always congruent to the angle (h00 , k00 ). (A similar construction to the
previous one.)

IV. 6.

Let ABC and A0 B0 C 0 be two triangles such that AB is congruent to A0 B0 , AC is congruent
to A0 C 0 , <BAC is congruent to <B0 A0 C 0 . Then not always <ABC is congruent to <A0 B0 C 0
and <ACB is congruent to <A0 C 0 B0 .
[For example, Let M, N be two distinct points in delta2-f 2, thus obtaining the triangle
PMN; Now take three points R, M 0 , N 0 in delta1-f 1, such that RM 0 is congruent to PM,
RN 0 is congruent to RN, and the angle (RM 0 , RN 0 ) is congruent to the angle (PM, PN).
RM 0 N 0 is an obvious triangle. Of course, the two triangles are not congruent, because for
example PM and PN cut each other twice ± in P and Q ± while RM 0 and RN 0 only once ±
in R. (These are geodesical triangles.)]
Definitions. Two angles are called supplementary if they have the same vertex, one side
in common, and the other sides not common form a line. A right angle is an angle
congruent to its supplementary angle. Two triangles are congruent if its angles are
congruent two by two, and its sides are congruent two by two.
Propositions. A right angle is not always congruent to another right angle.
For example: Let A-P-s1-Q be a line, with A lying in delta1-f 1, and B-P-s1-Q another line,
with B lying in delta1-f 1 and B not lying in the line AP; we consider the tangent t at s1 in
P, and B chosen in a way that <(AP, t) is not congruent to <(BP, t); let A0 , B0 be other
points lying in delta1-f 1 such that <APA0 is congruent to <A0 P-s1-Q, and <BPB0 is
congruent to <B0 P-s1-Q.
Then the angle APA0 is right, because it is congruent to its supplementary (by
construction), and the angle BPB0 is also right, because it is congruent to its
supplementary (by construction). But <APA0 is not congruent to <BPB0 , because the first
one is half of the angle A-P-s1-Q, i.e. half of <(AP, t), while the second one is half of the
B-P-s1-Q, i.e. half of <(BP, t).
The theorems of congruence for triangles [side, side, and angle in between; angle,
angle, and common side; side, side, side] may not hold either in the critical zone (s1, s2, f 1,
f 2) of the model.
Property: The sum of the angles of a triangle can be:
.

180 degrees, if all its vertexes A, B, C are lying, for example, in delta1-f 1;

.

strictly less than 180 degrees (any value in the interval (0, 180)). For example, let R, T
be two points in delta2-f 2 such that Q does not lie in RT, and S another point on s2;
then the triangle SRT has <(SR, ST) congruent to 0 because SR and ST have an
infinite number of common points (the segment SQ), and <QTR + <TRQ congruent
to 180 ± <TQR [ by construction we may vary <TQR in the interval (0, 180)], even 0
degrees! Let A be a point in delta1-f 1, B a point in delta2-f 2, and C a point on s3, very
close to P; then ABC is a non-degenerate triangle (because its vertexes are noncolinear), but <(A-P-s1-Q-B, A-P-s3-C) = <(B-Q-s1-P-A, B-Q-s1-P-s3-C) = <(C-s3-P-A,
C-s3-P-s1-Q-B) = 0 (one considers the length C-s3-P-s1-Q-B strictly less than C-s3-B);
the area of this triangle is also 0!

.

more than 180 degrees. For example; let A, B be two points in delta1-f 1, such that
<PAB + <PBA + <(s1, s2; in Q) is strictly greater than 180 degrees; then the triangle
ABQ, formed by the intersection of the lines A-P-s2-Q, Q-s1-P-B, AB will have the
sum of its angles strictly greater than 180 degrees.

Definition. A circle of center M is a totality of all points A for which the segments MA are
congruent to one another.
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For example, if the center is Q, and the length of the segments MA is chosen greater than
the length of s1, then the circle is formed by the arc of circle centered in Q, of radius MA,
and lying in delta2, plus another arc of circle centered in P, of radius MA-length of s1,
lying in delta1.
Group V. Anti-axiom of continuity (anti-Archimedean axiom)
Let A, B be two points. Take the points A1, A2, A3, A4, . . . so that A1 lies between A and A2, A2
lies between A1 and A3, A3 lies between A2 and A4, etc. and the segments AA1, A1A2, A2A3,
A3A4, . . . are congruent to one another.
Then, among this series of points, not always there exists a certain point An such that B lies
between A and An.
[For example, let A be a point in delta1-f 1, and B a point on f 1, B different from P; on the line
AB consider the points A1, A2, A3, A4, . . . in between A and B, such that AA1, A1A2, A2A3,
A3A4, etc. are congruent to one another; then we find that there is no point behind B (considering
the direction from A to B), because B is a limit point (the line AB ends in B).]
Bolzano's (intermediate value) theorem may not hold in the critical zone of the model.
Appendix 5. Fourth example of model M7 in Rugina's orientation table
The inconsistent system of axioms, and the contradictory theory (the percentage of instability is
100 ± even. . . more, this is the system of chaos!)
Let (a1), (a2), . . ., (an), (b) be n  1 independent axioms, with n > 1; and let b0  be another
axiom contradictory to (b). We construct a system of n  2 axioms:
a1; a2; . . . ; an; b; b0 ;

I 

which is inconsistent. But this system may be shared into two consistent systems of independent
axioms:
C

a1; a2; . . . ; an; b;

C 0 

a1; a2; :::; an; b0 :

and
We also consider the partial system of independent axioms:
P

a1; a2; . . . ; an:

Developing P, we find many propositions (theorems, lemmas):
p1; p2; . . . ; pm;
by combinations of its axioms.
Developing C, we find all propositions of P:
p1; p2; . . . ; pm;
resulting by combinations of (a1), (a2), . . ., (an), plus other propositions:
r1; r2; :::; rt;
resulting by combinations of (b) with any of (a1), (a2), ..., (an).
Similarly for [C 0 ], we find the propositions of [P]:
p1; p2; . . . ; pm;
plus other propositions
r 0 1; r0 2; . . . ; r0 t;

resulting by combinations of (b0 ) with any of (a1), (a2), . . ., (an), where (r 0 1) is an axiom
contradictory to (r1), and so on.
Now, developing [I ], we'll find all the previous resulted propositions:
p1; p2; . . . ; pm;
r1; r2; . . . ; rt;
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r 0 1; r0 2; . . . ; r0 t:
Therefore, [I] is equivalent to [C ] reunited to [C 0 ].
From one pair of contradictory propositions {(b) and (b0 )} in its beginning, [I] adds t more
such pairs, where t  1, {(r1) and (r0 1), . . ., (rt) and (r 0 t)} , after a complete step. The further we
go, the more pairs of contradictory propositions are accumulating in [I].
It is interesting to study the case when n  0.
Why do people avoid thinking about the contradictory theory?
As you know, nature is not perfect: opposite phenomena occur together, and opposite ideas
are simultaneously asserted and, ironically, proved that both of them are true! How is that
possible?
A statement may be true in a referential system, but false in another one. The truth is
subjective. The proof is relative. (In philosophy there is a theory that ``knowledge is relative to the
mind, or things can be known only through their effects on the mind, and consequently there can
be no knowledge of reality as it is in itself'', called ``the Relativity of Knowledge''; see Webster's
New World Dictionary of American English, 1988, p. 1133)
You know? . . .sometimes is good to be wrong!
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